ALDE Representation in the Arab World - Beirut 2013

The suicide mission of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

The day Mohamed Morsi was elected as the first civilian president of Egypt in June last year most reform minded people were hopeful. With many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood Morsi spent many years in prison. No doubt they would do everything to change this ‘society of paranoia’, wouldn’t they? In his first speech as elected president Morsi also promised to form an inclusive government and to appoint a female and a Coptic vice-president. The main question back in June was how Morsi would deal with the army. In a ‘mini-coup’ the army curtailed the president’s position and absolved the People’s Assembly.

And yes, Morsi’s first decisions were bold. He tried to reinstall the People’s assembly. He turned back the ‘mini-coup’ of the army and took the power back. On top of this he fired Field-Marshall Tantawi (and his number two Sami Anan), to replace him with general Sisi. Morsi also appointed as his presidential advisors people from all over the political and religious spectrum. All these steps were of major importance. Not only for Egypt that seemed to be on the way to a rapid reform from a autocratic to a democratic state. The entire world was watching closely.

Moreover, it is hard to underestimate the leading role of Egypt in the Arab world. Egypt is by far the most populated country and claims the historical leadership of the Arab society. Not less important is the fact that the largest political organisation in the Arab world has its origins and its leadership in Egypt: the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is like the communist party in Russia in times of the Soviet-Union. All sister parties in the region are following very closely what they are saying and doing.

Generous in victory, gracious in defeat

Contrary to their promises the Muslim Brotherhood was not very generous in victory. No female or Coptic vice-president was appointed. The government appeared to be not inclusive. The presidential advisors from outside the Brotherhood were not listened to, while the ones of the Brotherhood had nothing to say. Very soon the old underground culture of following orders instead of discussing them found back its place at the presidential palace. What came back as well was suspicion: every one is against us. The consequence was a bunker mentality: outside the bunker there is a huge conspiracy against the Muslim Brotherhood. The only option is to fight back.

So, that’s what the Muslim Brotherhood did, fighting back. First they replaced the editors in chief of most of the main newspapers. Then they tried to sideline liberal and Coptic voices in the Constitutional Committee. Then Morsi took all power by presidential decree. He sidelined the Constitutional Court and installed his own public prosecutor. He finished the Constitution and put it to a referendum two weeks later.

As the reaction of the people was much bigger than they thought, the Muslim Brothers saw their conspiracy theory confirmed. The only way was fighting back even harder. On the streets and by court. The new public prosecutor started accusing opposition politicians, activists and random people in the street.
However, it must be said that the opposition wasn’t gracious in defeat either. After they organized themselves in the National Salvation Front (NSF) they boycotted as good as everything. By doing so the NSF didn’t miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. They refused to talk to president Morsi, to vice-president Mekki and to the Muslim Brotherhood. They boycotted the Constitutional Committee, the referendum and the elections. If 38 percent of the Egyptians went to vote against the referendum, it was despite and not thanks to the opposition.

The collapse is becoming very close

If all political turmoil would happen in an economic prosperous environment, then the citizens would react with increasing apathy. Unfortunately, the exact contrary is happening. Morsi launched his presidential decree and the constitution during the negotiations with the IMF. Although the IMF is politically neutral, turmoil and fights in the street does make them doubt about the political stability and thus the ability to reform.

Today the IMF doubts proved to be right. No deal has been made. This means that Egypt misses a loan of in total 14,5 billion dollar as the loans of institutions as the EU, the EBRD and the African Union are connected to the one of the IMF. At the same time the Egyptian Pound is faltering, power cuts become a daily issue, rows of cars and trucks waiting for diesel are growing. Tourism – the main source of income – is a disaster. Investors are waiting, while large foreign companies are one after the other leaving the country.

For the average Egyptian the cost of living is becoming a nightmare. The anger is clearly growing. And instead of seeing politicians working hard to improve this situation, they see them fighting and taking decisions about blocking porn on the internet or allowing police officers to grow a beard. Instead of creating an investment friendly environment, the Muslim Brothers are targeting activists, journalists and comedians for insulting the president or insulting religion.

The question is not if but when it will explode

It is hard to overestimate the anger and the fear of the Egyptian people. You could compare it with a room full of gas. It only needs one spark in order to make it 3
explode. That spark could well be the subsidies for bread and energy that need to be reformed. The last time Egypt tried to cut subsidies was in 1977, under Sadat; it immediately lead to the only uncontrollable riots ever. If we see the anarchy today in cities as Port Said, Suez or Malhalla, it is clear that no party will be able to control the streets if the situation explodes.

In the meantime, president Morsi and his government are making the one mistake after the other. It’s as if the Muslim Brotherhood is on a suicide mission. Not only for Egypt but also for the entire Arab world. The same day Morsi issued his decree in November 2012, the protest for political reform in Jordan halted as they feared only the Jordanian Muslim Brothers would profit from it. A few days ago the Syrian Muslim Brothers even complained that their Egyptian counterparts were ruining their reputation.

We know from history that the situation of Egypt is not exceptional. France for example did eighty years from revolution to a stable democracy. And the transition in Central-Europe took almost two decades. History teaches us that the biggest danger in times of collapse and anarchy is the rise of a new populist or a new strong man. That could be someone like the Salafist Abu Ismail or again someone of the army. That would bring the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the opposition back to square one.

But that doesn’t mean chaos is the only way. Although it is already very late, it isn’t too late to move this country forward. Egypt has everything: natural resources, a young ambitious population and the most attractive touristic combination in the world. The only thing that is needed is parties and politicians forgetting their ego and their honour and start a real dialogue about solving problems together. The last window of opportunity is closing rapidly. I hope that the Egyptian politicians, for the sake of the people of Egypt, don’t miss this last chance. Otherwise, there will be no winners left.

Inside the Free Syrian Army

Last month, I was three times in Northern Syria with the Free Syrian Army (FSA). I spoke to many defected generals, commanders on the ground, people of the headquarters of the FSA and military-civilian organizers of humanitarian aid of all parts of Syria. I have eaten with them the modest food they offered and slept between the soldiers on the ground. I also spent many hours with Dr. Brigadier General Salim Idriss, Chief of Staff of the FSA and I was in the middle of a battle at Quweris airport, then one of the main front lines. I also had the exceptional honour of being the first non-Syrian to be allowed in the headquarters of the FSA, where I spent two full days and one night.

Crossing the Turkish border into Syria is not easy. The Turkish police doesn’t allow any non-Syrians to go in, except if you have an international press card. The only way to cross the border is to follow the smugglers track trough the olive fields, bribe Turkish soldiers and pretend you are Syrian. Problem is that if you go in illegally, you also have to go back illegally. Otherwise you have to pay a fine of 1000 Turkish lira at the airport. Twice I had to be go back to Turkey, at night, running over a hill, following the smugglers. You have to hurry in order to be faster than the police dogs. And when you arrive in this tiny border village in Turkey, you have to trust on people you don’t know in order to bring you back to the civilized world. If you are unlucky, like I was last time, you have to change route in order to avoid the crossfire of military clashes.

Despite the risk, it is important to go and see on the ground what is happening. And each time I was in Syria, I have seen how the FSA is changing rapidly. It even changed that rapidly that many observers cannot follow anymore. Col. Riaad Assad for example is completely out of the picture, whatever he himself might say. Also other self proclaimed spokesman or representatives of the FSA are in reality only speaking for themselves.

However, I must admit that the structure of the FSA is utterly confusing, even if you have talked to a lot of commanders. Whoever you talk to on the ground will pretend he is the most important commander in Syria. He will denounce formal structures and glorify his own past as a freedom fighter. I learned that the best strategy is smiling. And waiting. After an hour of ranting the real story comes out. Every time. Then it appears that the FSA does have a structure, that these commanders do operate within this structure, but that it is not fully established yet. The FSA is not just a brand. It does exist. The FSA building stands up, but is indeed still under construction.

The French Resistance

One could compare the FSA with the French Resistance in the Second World War. The Free French Forces, established by Charles De Gaulle in London in 1940, was nothing more than a name and a few officers. In 1941, one year later, little groups started to unite. However, it was still impossible to talk about a “Free French Army”. There was not only a fragmentation in structure and command, but also in ideology. Call it the Riad Al-Assad era of the Free French Army.

It was only in May 1943 that (thanks to the work of Jean Moulin) the resistance forces were unified, militarily and politically in the Conseil National de la Résistance (CNR) under the leadership of Charles De Gaulle. It took the Free French Forces three years to unite. After the unification not all difficulties were gone. After the unification it took again some time to become fully operative on the ground. Call it the Salim Idriss era.

The Riad Al Assad era or the former structure of the FSA

Until one year ago there was no structure at all in the Syrian armed rebellion. Every little group was called a battalion, whether it consisted of 20 or 200 fighters. The creation of the FSA by Col. Riad Al Assad in July 2011 was just as symbolic (but also as important) as the creation of the Free French Forces by De Gaulle in 1940. On 23 October, the FSA merged with the Free Officers Movement, becoming the main organization for military defectors. Pure branding or not, it deserved the credit of at least trying to do something about the fragmentation. It gave the signal to the many battalion commanders that co-operation is the only way to go.

That is exactly what happened the next year. From July 2011 until September 2012, there were many initiatives in order to create larger entities. We saw the birth of brigades like Liwa Al Tawheed and Farouk. We saw the creation of military councils, administrative councils, revolutionary councils and civilian councils. Some initiatives were pushed by the Friends of Syria or by individual countries. Aid, money or weapons were promised if the resistance would only get organized.

Unfortunately, these international actions lacked co-ordination as well. The result was that the Syrian opposition on the ground created several parallel structures. Another problem was the split between defected soldiers on the one hand, and civilians who took up arms on the other. Defected officers from the Syrian army organized themselves in military councils, while the civilians created revolutionary councils. In some places, like in Homs, there were even two military councils. Although these councils often co-operated in battles on the ground, the lack of unity created a clear disadvantage when it came drawing up a military strategy.

This lack of unity and strategy not only meant a disadvantage in the field, it also helped Assad’s propaganda. Even as the FSA had no communication strategy at all, the Assad machine knew very well what to do: discredit the FSA. There are three lines of attack:

The FSA is chaos. So it’s Assad or chaos in Syria and the region;
The FSA is a danger to minorities. Assad is the only guarantee for the security of minorities in Syria;
The FSA is extremist. Assad is the only one who can keep out Al Qaeda. I have been surprised to see how well-organized the Assad communication machine is.

In every country in the West, media groups are working on spreading these three messages. Meanwhile, the FSA, which has too many self-appointed spokespersons and lacks a clear message on what it wants and who it is, is slowly loosing the communication war. One could say the FSA was in this position from July 2011 until December 2012. It is the same situation in which the Free French Army found itself from 1940 to 1942.

The Salim Idriss era or the new structure of the FSA

On 7 December 2012, 260 officers of the FSA gathered in Antalya in Turkey. They elected a Higher Council of Revolutionary and Military Forces and a Chief of Staff, Dr. Brigadier General Salim Idriss. General Idriss defected in June 2012. The main reason why he was elected is his talent for persuading people in a softly-spoken way. He is more a Montgomery than a Patton. Col. Riad Al Assad wasn’t present at the meeting. They decided he would keep the title of General Commander of the FSA, but this would be a symbolic, rather than an operational title. His era is over now.

In Antalya, the revolutionary and military components were merged. So instead of military councils and revolutionary councils, there are now civilian-military councils. They also organized the FSA into five fronts: the Northern Front (Aleppo and Idlib), the Eastern Front (Raqqa-Deir Ezzor and Al Hassakah), the Western Front (Hama-Latakia-Tartus), the Central Front (Homs-Rastan) and the Southern Front (Damascus-Dar’a-Suwayda).

Each front has its civilian-military council and its commander. Each region/city within the front has its deputy commander, with, again, its own civilian-military council. I met with two front commanders: Qasem Saad Eddin, commander of the Central Front and Abdelbasset Tawil, commander of the Northern Front, and with his deputy commanders. They showed me detailed, strategic military plans. They also showed me lists of who received which weapons. It was clear that they were in close contact with Salim Idriss. Because of the strategic importance of Homs, Qasem Saad Eddin has an office next to the one of Salim Idriss in the headquarters of the FSA.

The Higher Council of Revolutionary and Military Forces consists of 30 people. Every front has six representatives in the Council, three military and three civilian ones. They are mainly responsible for the search for and the distribution of ammunition. Contrary to what has been promised, very few weapons are coming in. I have seen how the FSA had to fight cluster bombs in Quweris with self-made arms.

Just like the Free French Forces in 1943, Salim Idriss has now also started creating a political line for the FSA. Until recently, we only knew what they were fighting against: Assad. Now they are trying to formulate what they are fighting for and get their spokesmen on the same line. This message in English and Arabic of Salim Idriss on the second anniversary of the Syrian revolution is an example of how they are moving forward on this.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yEBHVCjxYQ0

FSA is a bottom-up unification, still in construction

No-one will deny that, while the FSA has made big steps forward, there is still a long way to go in order to become a well-functioning, united force like the French resistance in 1943. Idriss has to unify battalions that are used to work independently. It takes a huge effort to convince them to walk in the same direction. What are the main problems?

There is hardly any communication infrastructure. Today commanders have to communicate through Skype. In many places there is no Internet connection. That is why many officers have to travel to the headquarters in order to exchange information. It is very difficult to organize and unify an army in these conditions. That is why we should not be surprised if at a certain moment one of the battalions is acting on its own or is making a strategic mistake.
There are hardly any arms coming in. I was present during two days at the headquarters of the FSA. I saw officers coming from Homs, Deir Ezzor and many other places who wanted to meet with Chief of Staff, Salim Idriss, in order to get weapons. They were all pretty desperate. I heard many times: “How can we win the war, if we don’t have arms against these planes or tanks?” A Chief of Staff only gets recognition and authority if he can arm his own soldiers. This is basic. De Gaulle didn’t unify because of his charisma neither.
Getting totally fragmented forces onto the same page takes a lot of time. Quite some battalions, certainly the revolutionary ones, have no experience in fighting in a hierarchy. So, although they might recognize the authority of the Higher Military Council, they still don’t always understand what that exactly means in the day-to-day battle. Give them some time.
The growing importance of extremist battalions like Jabhat Al Nusra is a problem for the image and the organization of the FSA. Lund writes they do not use the brand of the FSA. Of course they don’t and they will never do. They are no part of the FSA and will never be. The fact that the other groups do use the name of the FSA means they distance themselves from Nusra and its Jihadist ideology.

The FSA deserves our support

It is fair to say that the FSA is not the well-oiled force some are dreaming of. But it is unfair and incorrect to say that the FSA does not exist and that it is not more than a brand.

Just like in France during the Second World War we can’t expect a bottom-up resistance to become a unified front in a few months. Becoming cynical now or even giving up on the FSA would be one of the biggest strategic mistakes the West could make.

Last month’s work is done and a lot of progress has been made. If the international community decides to support the FSA, it will help them even more to unify, strategize and avoid mistakes. There is a structure of command. The headquarters will only provide arms to those battalions that follow their instructions. But they are still waiting for those arms. What is coming in is peanuts compared with what they need in order to win this war against one of the most brutal dictators of the world. What are we waiting for?