I have been asked to speak about “Freedom and Security”, foreign affairs at the start of the 21st century, about policies towards our neighbours, with specific reference to the Mediterranean area, particularly the western Mediterranean.
Until a few years ago everyone tended to see the Mediterranean as a fault-line between civilizations, where a confrontation might occur, in the terms described by the Harvard professor of political science, Samuel P. Huntington.
The waters of the Mediterranean separate the Christian north from the Muslim south, at some points by a distance of only a few kilometres. And there are circumstances conducive to such a problematic confrontation, the most important of which is the strong demographic growth of the south in comparison with the very slow growth of the north. Above all, it might become a serious fault-line in the event of a global worsening of Western-Islamic conflict.
Western Europe, the frontier between the Islamic and the Christian Orthodox worlds, has—perhaps because of the disintegration of the Soviet bloc—suffered several conflicts in recent decades: the bloodbath of Bosnia and Sarajevo, the violence between Serbia and Albania in Kosovo, not to mention the violence between Ossetians and Ingushes, the slaughters between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and a variety of conflicts between Russian and the Islamic world. Within Bulgaria itself there is a frontier that has proved problematic. However, in the western Mediterranean no such conflict has occurred. The most we have seen is the tiny military occupation of the island of Perejil by Morocco and the sometimes relatively massive landings of Moroccan immigrants in Andalusia or the Canaries or of Libyan immigrants in Lampedusa. So, in spite of the conflictive situations that exist—religious, demographic and economic conflicts—I am convinced that, rather than a fault-line, the western Mediterranean may represent common ground for cooperation.
What has to be done to achieve cooperation rather than rupture? In my view, this is as easy—or as difficult—as it is for countries such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya or Egypt to develop truly democratic societies where there is freedom and economic progress.
There are those who have argued that democracy is a plant which, for political and cultural reasons, will not adapt to Islamic soil, that in those countries authoritarianism is an unchangeable state of affairs. We cannot accept this interpretation. Freedom and democracy are not products of history that arose in the West and have to be exported to the rest of the world. Freedom is something that has to open up its own road in the Islamic world, in North Africa, just as it had to do in France or the United States in the 19th Century, in the nineteen-seventies in Spain, Portugal and Greece and in the nineteen-eighties in the former Soviet-bloc countries.
Democracy already exists within North Africa society, it already exists in social and political debate. Democracy is not something imposed from the outside, imposed by the West.
It is true that in the Maghreb the arrival of true democracy might open the Pandora’s box of the conflicts that are latent in those societies. And in truth there are many conflicts: identity conflicts to be resolved (the Western Sahara issue, the Berber question), severe problems of social stagnation, economic stagnation, et cetera. We cannot doubt, however, that the pursuit of democracy is the right choice. Elections legitimize power and you can be certain that the existence of authoritarian regimes, even if favourable to the West, can only nourish extremism.
We welcome, therefore, the democratic progress that has been made since 1989 in Morocco. We welcome the constitutional advances, the progressive structuring of parties and the 2002 elections, the legislation on favour of women, et cetera. Nor can we fail to welcome the steps towards democracy in Algeria and how that country has come through a very difficult and very violent period. We also welcome the constitutional changes in Tunisia and are even watching hopefully the good signs that come from the closed Libyan regime.
Nonetheless, we are not ingenuous about the quality of democracy in these countries and we are perfectly well aware that the holding of regular elections is a necessary condition for the existence of democracy, but not a sufficient one. There must also be the rule of law with full guarantees, independent institutions, truly free political parties and freedom of expression; in all these respects, the Maghreb countries have a long way to go. The situation of the Moroccan journalist Li Lamrabet, now in exile in Barcelona, and that of several Algerian journalists, testify to the fragility of these democracies.
What we can do to strengthen these democratic processes? What must we do, the countries of the other shore of the Mediterranean, the European countries?
For there to be a strengthening of the democratic process it is important that there be dialogue between Europe and the Maghreb and interchange at all levels. I am not speaking here only of dialogue with political authorities who, while conscious of the need for political opening, want at the same time to keep a substantial slice of power for themselves; I am also speaking of dialogue with civil society, with the intellectuals, with the young people and with women. Dialogue, dialogue, dialogue!
That is the formula.
Dialogue, furthermore, that propitiates exchanges of all sorts, including economic ones. My country, Catalonia, has in recent years encouraged important investment by its companies in Morocco. We are pleased with the results, even though the companies are calling for more legal safeguards and less state presence in economic processes. At all events, until the two shores of the Mediterranean enter the still Utopian arena of free trade or we make the Maghreb countries even more favoured partners of the European Union, we have to see how far we can get through the establishment of companies in this way.
Very soon, in November to be precise, we will have a major opportunity to assess the possibilities for this dialogue and this exchange. It will be ten years since the meeting that initiated the Barcelona Process. Ten years on is a good time to see how far we have come and what possibilities lie before us.
OTHER POINTS:
The importance of stability
Europe needs stable, well-governed and democratic neighbours. We now know, from experience, that the destabilization of our neighbours is not just their problem, it is ours too. That is because even the smallest crisis will bring thousands of immigrants to knock on our gates. If there is major destabilization and, for example, there is violence, there is then not just a major immigration problem, but also one of terrorism, organized crime, prostitution networks, drugs, et cetera.
Europe, as a strategy and in its own interest, needs very stable neighbours to the south and the west. However, it is not enough to produce stability among our neighbours. The resolution of the Palestine-Israeli conflict, on which many other conflicts depend, for example, is also a strategic priority for Europe and that is why we do well to be involved there. The resolution of the conflict in the Western Sahara, in a framework with the blessing of the United Nations, is also a wound that needs to be closed.
And further a field: from the point of view of Spain, it is in our interests for Argentina to do well, because their problems come to affect us. Bear this in mind: as long as Ecuador was not constantly in the papers because of its series of crises, there was hardly any Ecuadorian immigration into Spain. Ten years ago less than a thousand Ecuadorians lived there. The country’s political and social upheavals, unfortunately still active, have meant that there are now 500,000 Ecuadorians in Spain. In this regard, everything that happens in South and Central America concerns us a lot. We are now worried, for example, about what will happen if we are not able to ensure a post-Castro transition in Cuba.
What must Europe’s military strategy be in the area?
Europe must take more care of its military security, let us be clear about it. We cannot be so dependent on the United States. In the case of the Mediterranean, we defend certain policies that go beyond national defence policy to involve NATO and the European Union. It is inadmissible that, as is the case in Spain with the Organic Law for National Defence, that this issue is approached in a way that does not take enough account of this wider framework than that of the nation state.
On the other hand, I believe that NATO and the EU must work harder on defence issues with the Maghreb countries. NATO and the EU can offer support and military advice, but also support in the fight against terrorism.
These days, in Europe, and the Mediterranean, we do not need military strength because of a military threat such as that which existed during the Cold War. Europe has to be more concerned about the destabilization of its neighbours than about a military threat. Hence, we need military strength in order to put it into play in those world conflicts that could generate destabilization. Europe’s military strength must impose that stability that procures peaceful solutions, and hence avoids refugees, immigrants, and drifts towards organized crime or terrorism.
Beyond dialogue, Europe must take respect for human rights and democracy prevail.
It is clear that with democracies as fragile as those of the Maghreb, the effectiveness of dialogue is relative. T hat is why other mechanisms need to be put into action. To take an example: the Vienna Conference on Human Rights in 1993 recommended that every state draw up a national plan for the promotion of human rights. This measure, which Amnesty International has repeatedly insisted should be put into effect, would allow each state to evaluate—and in some cases rule out—its agreements, cooperation and interchanges according to the extent to which prospective partners respect human rights. Well, so far only seventeen countries have drawn up such a plan. Spain had not done so, therefore our party Convergència i Unió put down a motion in the Spanish parliament calling for it to be done. It was approved last April. With this plan we can be much more demanding of our partners and when we make economic, trade, or higher education agreements.
The role of the United Stated and Europe to stimulate democratisation
In recent months we have seen a notable extension of democracy. In the ex-Soviet zone we have seen the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine and another in Kyrgyz Stan. And we witnessed, half surprised, how in a scene of dubious diplomacy but exemplary forthrightness Condoleezza Rice demanded from Putin a greater strengthening of democracy in Russia. We have not only seen progress in the former Soviet world, however. In the Arab world there have also been steps in the right direction. In spite of all the difficulties the peoples of Afghanistan and Iraq have been able to go to the polls. There have been municipal elections in Saudi Arabia and even the closed Syrian regime and its single party are facing up to the need for democratic reform. In its own way, it must be recognized that the United States is putting on a lot of pressure for democratisation. In view of all this evidence, I believe that Europe should practice a more active policy to promote democracy, particularly in our zone of influence.
