The noble aspirations of the Responsibility to Protect (also known as “R2P”) are under threat like never before. The problem is not just that the incidence of atrocity crimes has increased since the historic lows achieved in this century’s first decade, thanks largely to the eruption of violent conflict and mass atrocities in the Middle East and Sahel and the collapse of South Sudan into chaos. Nor is it primarily to do with the rise of non-state armed groups and violent extremists that commit and glorify brazen atrocities. Both of these are significant challenges that demand fresh thinking and renewed efforts to prevent and respond more effectively to atrocity crimes. The size of the challenge, though, is magnified by an increasing problem of political commitment and gnawing doubt about whether the international community, including its liberal states, really meant it when it committed itself to R2P.
Unanimously agreed by Heads of State and Government in 2005, and unanimously affirmed by both the UN General Assembly and its Security Council, R2P is a disarmingly simple idea that no government now disputes. It holds that states are responsible for protecting their populations from atrocity crimes and that they should assist one another in fulfilling this responsibility. When atrocity crimes occur, the international community should use “diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” to protect populations and should these be ineffective, should take “timely and decisive action” to protect populations using all the powers available to the UN Security Council, including economic sanctions, criminal prosecutions and the use of force if necessary. Yet despite this clear and unqualified commitment to forge a world free of mass atrocities, international practice has been less than resolute.
There have been some notable successes. In Kenya in 2013, determined international action helped prevent a repeat of the communal violence that marred that country’s 2008 election. In Guinea in 2008, a country’s slide into atrocity crimes was halted. As bad as things are in Libya, they might have been much worse had it not been for the decisive action taken in 2011. Those that think otherwise should consider the much greater price of inaction in Syria. Meanwhile, it remains to be seen whether the world has done enough to stem violence in Burundi and Myanmar’s remarkable transition remains in the balance. But too often, as in the Central African Republic (CAR), the international community has been too slow to act or, as in Syria, too divided to do so. Most worrying of all, however, is the evidence of growing impunity. Not only are violent extremists becoming more brazen, the past year has also seen great powers violate the laws of armed conflict or provide material support to those that do.
Of course, R2P was always meant to be a challenge. It is deliberately aspirational. After all, R2P emerged from the world’s failure to protect the civilians of Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s. R2P is doing its job when it exposes the fact that the international community has failed the people of Syria, responded too slowly to the crisis in CAR, and has yet to establish peace and protection in South Sudan. R2P has helped raise our collective expectation that populations around the world ought to be protected from atrocity crimes. Exposing that gap between rhetoric and reality is a first step towards closing that gap, but it is imperative that those states that most loudly proclaim their commitment to R2P begin to take the steps needed to fulfil it. All too often, practice has fallen short of expectations and as that gap grows the institutions to which people look for protection will confront a crisis of legitimacy.
When traditional institutions fail to fulfil peoples’ needs, they look to alternatives. The emergence of violent extremist non-state armed groups that brazenly commit mass atrocities is one such consequence – arising as they do out of governance failures in the Middle East, Sahel and elsewhere. Tackling this new source of threat is main piece of unfinished conceptual work facing R2P. Doing so requires a three-part strategy that addresses the underlying causes of their violence, degrades their capacity to commit atrocities, and reduces the opportunities for them to do so.
Cleared eyed thinking is needed when it comes to addressing the underlying cause. These groups have not caused global instability but have emerged out of areas of protracted instability and civil war. To respond effectively, we need to deal with the causes and not just the consequences. That means committing political will, time and resources to finding political settlements to protracted conflicts and to helping states extend their authority and the rule of law into regions that have become increasingly lawless. It means providing viable and legitimate alternatives to extremist violence, ending practices of discrimination, and creating economic opportunities whilst reducing pronounced inequalities.
Degrading the means to commit atrocities requires a joined-up and transnational approach that involves implementing targeted strategies to counter violent extremist ideology, curbing the flow of recruits across borders, ending transnational flows of arms, finances and other goods that are needed to commit atrocities, and providing humanitarian support to vulnerable communities.
Finally, removing opportunity involves looking at the contexts in which these groups arise and recognising that groups such as IS, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda, and Boko Haram emerge out of protracted conflict and instability. To address this, more investment in conflict prevention, measures to reduce state fragility, and the resolution of ongoing armed conflict is needed. Above all, we must recognise that R2P and countering violent extremism are connected not just to one another, but also to more traditional agendas of international peace and security.
R2P is a challenge to world leaders, thought leaders and civil society actors alike. It is not a self-implementing panacea to the world’s problems. Whether or not the international community fulfils its commitment depends entirely on the choices we make. But unless those that champion the principle most loudly do more to support its realisation, more and more people will begin to ask whether world leaders really meant it when they promised an end to genocide and mass atrocities.
Professor Alex J. Bellamy, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director, Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at The University of Queensland, Australia and Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the International Peace Institute, New York
